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TORTS-STRIcT PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR RETAns?-Ulmer v. Ford
Motor Co., 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 537, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
In the field of products liability the Citadel of Privity1 has been
the bulwark that has shielded the manufacturer from the claims of
those injured by defective products. Early in this century an attack
was launched upon the Citadel, its walls first being breached in the
areas of negligence2 and implied warranty on food products The
attack continued to gain momentum, especially in the field of implied
warranty, until there had been a complete rout of the privity require-
ment in all product areas,4 and the fall of the Citadel could be pro-
claimed.' In its ruins the fortress of strict liability6 is being constructed
by a growing number of courts1 which have adopted this rule as ex-
1. The term was coined by Chief Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931) and was popularized by Dean Prosser in Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YA L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel] and its sequel, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MWN.
L. REv. 791 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel].
2. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. E.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
4. E.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965)
(shotgun); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (fabrics); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile).
The expansion of implied warranty protection to product areas other than food has
been accompanied by the rise of the UNIo=r Comumncm CODE in all states, save
Louisiana. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra.
5. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 1.
6. The concept of implied warranty is often used interchangeably with strict liability
in the products liability field. Prosser suggested that the courts discard the theory of
warranty, with its contract implications, in favor of strict liability in tort. He included
among the jurisdictions which had adopted the rule of strict liability those jurisdictions,
including Washington, which applied the concept of breach of implied warranty. Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 1, at 794-95. This note will use the words "strict
liability" to refer to only those jurisdictions -which have adopted the language of strict
liability in tort.
7. The following are states in which the highest court has adopted strict liability:
Alaska (Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969)); Arizona
(0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968)); California (Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963)); Connecticut (Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn.
549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967)); Florida (McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co. 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla.
1965) (dictum)); Illinois (Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965)); Minnesota (McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488
(1967)); Mississippi (State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966));
Nevada (Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855
(1966)); New Hampshire (Elliot v. Lachance, - N.H. -, 256 A.2d 153 (1969)); New
Jersey (Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)); New
York (Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963)); Oklahoma (Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900
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pressed by either Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965)1 or Greenman v. Yuba Power Productsf
In Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co."0 the Washington plaintiff brought suit
against the manufacturer of an automobile which had gone out of
control and crashed into a cement abutment due to a defectively in-
stalled "A frame" pivot bolt. Plaintiff, whose theory of recovery was
based on strict liability, was denied relief in the trial court. The Su-
preme Court of Washington reversed and remanded, adopting the
Restatement (Second) position and holding that plaintiff's theory re-
flected the import of cases previously decided by the court under the
theory of breach of implied warranty." The court abandoned the im-
plied warranty theory of recovery, concluding that it would be incon-
(Okla. 1965)); Oregon (Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967));
Pennsylvania (Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966)); Tennessee (Olney v.
Beaman Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 418 S.W.2d 430 (1967)); Texas (McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)); Washington (Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,
75 Wash. Dec. 2d 537, 452 P.2d 729 (1969)); Wisconsin (Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967)).
In the following states an intermediate appellate court has adopted strict liability:
Kentucky (Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1966)); Missouri (Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App.
1966)); Ohio (Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92
(1965) aff'd 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966) (warranty theory)).
In the following states the federal courts have construed strict liability to be the
rule of the state: Colorado (Schenfeld v. Norton Company, 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.
1968)); Indiana (Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co. 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965));
Montana (Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968)); Rhode
Island (Klimas v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D.R.I. 1969));
South Dakota (Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967) aff'd 408
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969)).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
9. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). The rule of the case was:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being.
377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
10. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 537, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
11. Id. at 546-47, 452 P.2d at 734.
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sistent to continue deciding cases on a warranty theory without
attaching the customary incidents of warranty.12
Most jurisdictions which follow the rule of strict liability against
manufacturers have extended it to retailers, 3 and Washington will
very likely follow suit. The Ulmer court declined to pass upon the
applicability of the rule to sellers other than manufacturers,14 reserving
these questions until they are properly before the court;"6 but it indi-
cated 6 that it will not necessarily apply strict liability across the board
to retailers as it did to manufacturers. Anticipating extension of the
Ulmer rule to retailers, this Note will suggest to what extent and in
what fashion the rule of strict liability should be applied to retailers
in Washington. Consideration will first be directed to the general argu-
ments in support of extension of the rule to retailers. Then attention
will be devoted to whether the extension should be to all retailers, and,
if not, to which ones.
I. THE ARGUMENTS
A. Introduction
The leading authorities for the extension of strict liability to re-
12. Id. at 544, 452 P.2d at 733. The customary incidents of warranty are privity,
reliance, timely notice of breach, and disclaimer. See Uziroa CoManMcIAr CODa §§ 2-
318, 2-315, 2-607(3), 2-316.
13. The following states have extended strict liability to retailers: Alaska (Clary v.
Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969)); Arizona (Bailey v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108 (1967)); California (Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964)); Colorado
(Newton v. Admiral Corp., 280 F. Supp. 202 (D. Colo. 1967) (dictum; applying Colo.
law)); Illinois (Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1966));
Indiana (Illncki v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying
Ind. law)); Kentucky (Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966));
Mississippi (State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966)); Missouri
(Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W. 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)); New Jersey (Citrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (retail
lessor)); Pennsylvania (Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (distributor));
Texas (Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968));
Wisconsin (Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (distributor)).
Cf. Florida (McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1966)). (Strict liability
to retailers recognized but with Sealed Container Doctrine exception) (See note 83 and
accompanying text infra.).
14. For a discussion of the application of strict liability to wholesalers see 19 MMM
L. REv. 92 (1967).
15. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 537, 547, 452 P.2d 729, 735 (1969). Suit here was brought
only against the manufacturer.
16. Id. at 547 n.5, 452 P.2d at 734-35 n.5.
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tailers are the Restatement (Second) o1 Torts1 7 and Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co."8 The Restatement (Second) rule is premised on a
concern for the safety of the public 9 and on the fact of consumer
reliance .2
In Vandermark2l the California court applied the Greenman rule to
retailers, stating :22
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of
distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the
overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products. [Citing Green-
man] In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that
enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other
cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965):
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of
selling products for use and consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer
of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the op-
erator of a restaurant. It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the
business of selling such products. Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion
picture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream, either for consumption on the
premises or in packages to be taken home.
The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller of food or other products
who is not engaged in that activity as part of his business. Thus it does not apply
to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her neighbor a jar of jam or a
pound of sugar.
18. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965):
* . . The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the
safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying
human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and
property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who
purchase such goods.
20. Id. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text infra.
21. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). Defendant was an
automobile dealer, against whom courts have more often imposed the rule of strict
liability than against other types of retailers. See R. HuRsur, AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 5A:24 (Cum. Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Huosii]; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
1057, 1099-1100 (1967). Hursh suggests that the reason may be that automobile dealers
have significant responsibilities in readying a product for delivery to the purchaser. In
Vandermark Justice Traynor took special note of these responsibilities, but for the
purpose of extending Ford's liability to defects which may occur during dealer prepara-
tion. 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. The distinction drawn by Hursh is not the
basis of the rule applied in Vandermark, and other courts have extended strict liability
to retailers of other types of products. See e.g., Illnicki v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 371
F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966) (power mower); McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577
(7th Cir. 1965) (boat); Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d
108 (1967) (pogo sticks); Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 347
(1966) (nails); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966) (water
heater); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)
(bottled drink).
22. 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964).
434
Strict Products Liability for Retailers
that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure
on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus
serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manu-
facturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the
injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they
can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course
of their continuing business relationship.
This view has found approval among legal scholars,23 and its reasoning
has been adopted by courts in other jurisdictions which have applied
strict liability to retailers. 4
The various reasons given by the Restatement (Second) and Van-
dermark to support extension of the doctrine of strict liability to re-
tailers may conveniently be classified for purposes of discussion under
six headings: (1) the safer product rationale, (2) the consumer reli-
ance argument, (3) the insurance argument, (4) the in personam
jurisdiction argument, (5) the conduit theory, and (6) the burden of
proof argument.
B. The Safer Product Rationale
The argument25 that the imposition of strict liability on the retailer
will cause him to pressure the manufacturer to produce a safer product
has been rejected by some legal scholars. 6 While it can be argued that
the safer product rationale does not by itself justify the imposition of
strict liability on those retailers who have no opportunity to discover
the defects that produce the harmful results,27 this objection does not
overcome the main advantage of strict liability-the fair allocation of
23. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAw OF ToRTs § 28.30 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER & JAmEs]; W. PROSSER, LAw oP TORTS § 97 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER oN TORTS]; S. Scm ERmm & P. RIxNm1uoLn, PRODuCTS LIABILITY 2:28
(1967) [hereinafter cited as SCHMERR & lPrfl.GOLo]; Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort
For Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 30,
45 (1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 1, at 816; Comment, Products
Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MIcH. L.
REV. 1350, 1371 (1966).
24. CLary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244, 247 (Alas. 1969); Sweeney
v. Matthews, 94 IL. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1966); Williams v. Ford Motor
Co., 411 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
25. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965).
26. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1122.
27. Keeton, supra note 26, at 1333.
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risk. A stronger argument against the safer product rationale is that
if the existing liability under warranty and negligence has not created
the necessary pressure, it is unlikely that a move to strict liability will
have any greater effect. This argument is also criticizable, however,
for if one assumes that liability for negligence has created at least some
pressure for safety, it follows that an increased risk of liability will
result in a corresponding increase in pressure.
C. The Consumer Reliance Argument
The consumer reliance argument" is two-fold: first, the retailer is
in a better position to know and ascertain the reliability and respon-
sibility of the manufacturer than is the purchaser," and secondly, the
customer is forced to rely upon the retailer's selection." Both aspects
of the argument ignore the impact of advertising on the retailer's posi-
tion."2 Except in cases of very large retail outlets, the demand for the
products a merchant sells is created by manufacturers through nation-
wide advertising. The retailer often has little choice over the brand he
carries if he wishes to maintain his competitive position. The cus-
tomer's reliance is more likely to be on the brand name than on the
retailer.
Even in product areas where advertising does not create reliance on
brand names, reliance may often be found elsewhere than on the re-
tailer. For instance, a retail druggist was held not liable under strict
28. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1122.
29. The consumer reliance argument is closely related to the Sealed Container Doc-
trine, available as a defense to a retailer in a minority of jurisdictions to an action in
implied warranty by a purchaser of a product which passes through the retailer's hands
in the same unopened packaging as when it leaves the manufacturer. The theory is
that there is no reliance on the skill and judgment of the retailer because the purchaser
knows that the retailer has not inspected it. For an excellent discussion of the doctrine
and the early decisions see Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835(1942). See also 2 L. FRU3ER & M. FRI=DmAN, PRODUCTS LIBM,= § 19.03(4) (c)
(1968) ; PROSSER oN TORTS, supra note 23, at 654. For a discussion of the Sealed Con-
tainer Doctrine in Washington see notes 77-84 and accompanying text infra. For a more
recent treatment of the doctrine in actions based on strict liability, see McLeod v. W. S.
Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1966) ; R. HuRsii, supra note 21, at 232 n.16; 1 CCH
PRODUCTS LABiLrry REP. 4160 (1968); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1099 (1967).
30. See Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918).
31. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965) and cases cited in
the Appendix (1966) thereto.
32. See Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn. 2d 347, 354, 378 P.2d 298, 302 (1963);
Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294, 297-98 (1961).
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liability for sale of a prescription that plaintiff received in the manu-
facturer's original sealed packets because the plaintiff's confidence had
been placed in her doctor, who in turn had relied on the representations
of the manufacturer.3 3
D. The Insurance Argument
The argument 4 that the retailer is able to obtain products liability
insurance and thereby protect himself from the consequences of strict
liability has been criticized 5 as evading the issue of whether strict
liability should be imposed on him in the first place. It is contended36
that the added insurance costs may force marginal operators out of
business. Although insurance is not "the answer," and strict product
liability cannot justifiably be premised on it alone, insurance would at
least reallocate the risk of loss, the major purpose of the rule. Further-
more, the burden of added insurance costs on the small retailer is often
relieved by suppliers whose products liability insurance is written with
an agreement to cover dealers as well 3 7
E. The In Personam Jurisdiction Argument
Another reason advanced for extending strict liability to retailers is
that the rule would help reduce the difficulty that injured parties face
when they attempt to obtain in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state
manufacturers. Two problems are encountered by such plaintiffs: con-
stitutional limitations and statutory construction of long-arm statutes.38
Following the elevation of the minimum contacts formula to a con-
stitutional level by the Supreme Court 39 state courts have been willing
to uphold statutory extension of in personam jurisdiction to a manu-
facturer who has no other contact with the forum state than the filling
of purchase or niail orders of its residents4 Another type of minimum
33. McLeod v. WV. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
34. See F. DicnnRsoe, PRoDuCTS LIAurrIiY AND TE FOOD CoNSUMaa 265-69 (1951).
35. See PRossER, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1121.
36. Id.
37. 2 HEauE' & JAmms, supra note 23, at 1601.
38. Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Products
Liability Actions, 63 MChc. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
39. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. Tice v. Wilmington Chemical Corp., 259 Iowa 27, 141 N.W.2d 616 (1966);
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965).
437
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contact, usually included in state long-arm statutes, is the "tortious
act."' But even if a "tortious act" is established,42 there may remain
the question as to whether the tort was committed outside the state
at the time of manufacture or within the state4 3 at the time of plain-
tiff's injury. In those states, including Washington, 44 which hold that
the place of wrong is where the last event necessary for liability occurs,
the plaintiff will experience no difficulty in obtaining service of process
over a nonresident manufacturer,4 5 when, for example, the manufac-
turer produces and sells his product outside the forum state for use
in the forum state.4
41. E.g., WASHx. REV. CoDE § 4.28.185 (1959) provides as follows:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts in this section enumerated, thereby submits
said person, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of
said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this state;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any property whether real or personal
situated in this state;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be made by personally serving
the defendant outside this state, as provided in RCW 4.28.180, with the same force
and effect as though personally served within this state.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted
against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based on this sec-
tion ... (emphasis supplied).
42. See comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Products Liability Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1028, 1036 (1965).
43. Under the typical long-arm statute the "tortious act" must be one committed
"within this state." See note 41 supra.
44. Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wn. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963), Noted in 39 VAsH. L. R~v.
24 (1964). But cf. Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
In Oliver service of process on an out-of-state retailer was quashed even though there
was a tortious act committed within the state. It was held that to extend long-armjurisdiction to an Oregon automobile dealer who sold a car to Oregon residents in Oregon
violated due process requirements because the retailer could not be held to have construc-
tive knowledge of out-of-state consequences. In this respect the court distinguished a
retailer from a manufacturer who would be held to have such constructive knowledge.
See 44 WAsHt. L. Rav. 490 (1969). In Oliver jurisdiction over the nonresident manufac-
turer was not contested, and the decision does not limit Nixon vis a vis manufacturers.
45. But see Dimeo v. Minster Mach. Co., 225 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1963 (the tort
is committed only at the place of negligent manufacture).
46. Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wn. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963) (amusement park ride
manufactured and sold in Oregon for use in Washington where manufacturer retained
security interest and serviced ride in Washington) ; State ex rel. Western Seed Production
Co. v. Campbell, 250 Ore. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968) cert. denied 393 U.S. 1093 (1969)
(seed grown and sold in Arizona to Oregon dealer and thence to Oregon farmer). Ci.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). (Nonresident manufacturer of component part, assembled in third state before
being sold and causing injury in the forum state held to have minimum contracts.)
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It would appear, therefore, that in those jurisdictions which have
long-arm statutes capable of a broad interpretation under the minimum
contacts formula, inaccessibility of the nonresident manufacturer to
process is not a valid reason to impose strict liability on retailers.
F. The Conduit Theory
More persuasive is the argument that the retailer is a convenient
conduit through which to pass the burden of the risk of loss back to
the manufacturer where it really belongs. It is generally held that a
retailer may recover over from his seller the amount he has been re-
quired to pay a consumer in damages, plus attorney's fees and the
reasonable costs of conducting a defense.4r The imposition of strict
liability in tort48 will not, therefore, impose an unfair burden on a re-
tailer since he may implead the manufacturer.4 9 But potential recovery
against the manufacturer may give retailers a false sense of security,
for injured consumers need only show that the product was defective
when it left the hands of the retailer; the retailer must show that the
product was defective when it left the hands of his seller. Judgment
against the retailer thus does not ensure judgment against the manu-
facturer.50
Nevertheless, it would seem fair to hold the retailer strictly liable
to the consumer. The ultimate purpose of strict products liability is
to relieve consumers of the burden of losses resulting from defective
products; the imposition of strict liability on retailers would further
that goal by ensuring that the burden of proof which plaintiffs carry
is just.
G. The Burden of Proof Argument
The greatest difficulty5 in establishing a strict products liability
47. Comment, The Right To Indemnity In Products Liability Cases, 1964 U. 1n.
L.F. 614, 626 (1964).
48. The practice of recovery over by a retailer against a manufacturer is currently
operative by the vouching procedure under warranty principles in the Uxwoaa Cox:-
mEIrc=A CODE § 2-607(5)(a).
49. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 405 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Wash.
Court R., CR 14; 2 HAER & JlA2Es, supra note 23, at 1601; Comment, The Right to
Indemnity in Products Liability Cases, 1964 U. LL. L.F. 614, 621-22 (1964).
50. E.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Houston v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118. (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968) (Retailer denied indemnity. Held not allowed to rely on injured consumer's
offer of proof.)
51. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1, at 1114-16; Comment,
Products Liability and the Problem of Proof, 21 STiA. L. REV. 1777 (1969); 26 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 143 (1969).
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case is proving that the defect existed at the time the product left the
hands of the seller.52 This burden of proof requirement is onerous
where it is applied without extending strict liability to the retailer and
wholesaler because it requires a plaintiff to account for the product
during the time prior to his purchase.
The burden of proof which an injured party bears53 can be made
more just in one of two ways: (1) by adopting a lesser standard, 4 or
(2) by maintaining the same standard but broadening the class of
persons subject to the strict liability rule, so that a consumer-plaintiff
would bear the burden of proving a defect only as against his im-
mediate seller." The first alternative would increase the opportunity
for fraud on the part of plaintiffs; 56 the second alternative would thus
seem to be a better approach. If an injured consumer were only re-
quired to prove a defect in the product at the time he bought it, he
would need show only that the defect could not have occurred after his
purchase, thus raising a presumption that the defect occurred while
the retailer or manufacturer had control of the product.57 Such a
burden of proof would be manifestly fair to all parties concerned. The
52. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965).
53. The majority in Ulmer did not state what burden of proof an injured plaintiff
carries under its newly adopted rule, other than to note that plaintiff produced suf-
ficient evidence to get to the jury. The issue was clearly before the court, being raised
by the jury's consideration of the age (5 years) and mileage (in excess of 73,000 miles)
of the car. The majority interpreted the jury instruction, allowing them to make such
a consideration, as a comment on the evidence, thus avoiding the issue of plaintiff's
burden of proof. A concurring opinion felt the majority went beyond the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) burden of proof, and, therefore, wanted it clearly understood that a mal-
function of a product by itself is not sufficient to create an inference that the elements
of strict liability are present.
54. Some jurisdictions do require a lesser burden of proof than the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND). See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965) aff'd 6
Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
55. The approach of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) is to apply strict liability to the
manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A,
Comment g (1965); thus alleviating the consumer's burden of proof by broadening the
class of persons subject to the strict liability rule.
56. See Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 949 (1957). A lesser burden of
proof may encourage people to assert spurious claims.
Fraud may have been the motivating concern of the concurring opinion in Ulmer.
See note 53 supra.
57. See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d
826 (1964); Comment, Products Liability and the Problem of Proof, 21 STr.. L. REv.
1777 (1969); 26 WAsu. & LEE L. Rv. 143 (1969).
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consumer, the retailer, the wholesaler, and the manufacturer would
each bear a burden of proof corresponding to his control over the
product. A retailer will not be unduly burdened by such a result since
he can usually pass the loss on to the manufacturer. What hardship
he does experience will "generally boil down in practice to the incon-
venience of acting as a conduit for spreading losses which are engen-
dered by the enterprise in which he plays a part." s
Six reasons have been suggested to justify the extension of strict
liability to retailers. The safer product rationale, the consumer reliance,
the insurance, and the in personam jurisdiction arguments are not
especially persuasive. However, the conduit theory and the burden of
proof argument are convincing and amply justify extending strict
liability to retailers.
II. WHICH RETAILERS
A. Introduction
Having examined the policy considerations and the rationale sug-
gested for the extension of strict liability to retailers generally, the
questions remain as to whether the rule should be imposed on all re-
tailers and, if not, on which retailers should it be imposed. The need
for full and careful consideration of these questions was most likely
the reason why the Washington court in Ulmer declined to announce
a rule of strict liability as to retailers as well as to manufacturers. If
strict liability is not to be applied across the board to retailers, two
considerations should be explored: (1) whether in applying the rule
a distinction should be made relative to the size of retailers, and (2)
whether retailers dealing in goods that come to them from manu-
facturers for resale in sealed containers should be subject to strict
liability for defects.
B. The Retailer Size Question
The reasons generally given to support the extension of the doctrine
of strict liability to retailers may not apply with equal force to every
size of retailer. Retailers are an integral part of the total enterprise
S8. 2 HREa & Jxum, supra note 23, at 160.
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system, but their relationships to manufacturers vary to a considerable
degree. There has been no hesitation in the courts to impose strict
liability on the large chain retail store that offers goods manufactured
by other firms under its own brand name,5 9 but concern has been ex-
pressed that the same burden on the small independent retailer is
"heavy-handed to the point of injustice. ' 60 Even the most vociferous
advocate of strict product liability recognizes the potentially disastrous
impact of the doctrine on the small businessman.61
Perhaps one reason that courts in general have not shied from ex-
tending the doctrine of strict liability to all retailers is that the small
independent retailer is being replaced by the large nationwide chain
store, which is often better able to absorb loss from such liability than
the small manufacturer who may supply it.62 On the other hand, it
has been argued that imposition of liability without fault will only
hasten this trend, squeezing the small entrepreneur into oblivion.'
Although the Washington court should be aware of this possibility, it
should also remember that the small retailer is already subject to a
heavy burden of liability under the Uniform Commercial Code's im-
plied warranty provisions, 4 and that the imposition of strict liability
in tort will not significantly expand this vulnerability.6
59. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108 (1967);
IlInicki v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966). See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) or TORTS § 400 (1965) (Such retailers are given the status of a manufacturer
and subject to the same liability.); 2 L. FRUTrER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRoDucTs LIABULIrY§ 18.01 (1968) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES supra note 23, § 28.28; PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note
23, at 664; SCHREIBER & RHEINGOLD, supra note 23, at 1:88; Noel, Products Liability of
Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REv. 207, 211-12 (1965).
60. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108, 117 (1967)
(Molloy, J. dissenting). Cf. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused
by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 947 (1957).
61. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1121-22 n.147, quoting
Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-
An Opposing View, 24 TEN. L. REv. 938, 947 (1957).
It is a common failing to overlook the problem of the small manufacturer ....
Their position in the industry is vulnerable and their competitive situation delicate.
It is these comparatively small manufacturers who suffer when additional costs are
added without regard to their situation. (The argument applies with equal force to
small retailers.)
62. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 23, at 682; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra
note 1, at 816.
63. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 431 P.2d 108, 117 (1967)
(Molloy, J., dissenting).
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
65. See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 17 WESTERN RESERVE L. REv. 5 (1965). Shanker argues that the move to
strict liability in tort is not necessary because the implied warranty provisions under
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C. The Packaged Container Question
In Ulmer the court noted" that it has not always allowed recovery
against a retailer under the theory of breach of implied warranty.
Such recovery has been allowed against retailers dealing in food
products,6 7 animal feed,6 8 dry goods,69 insecticides, 7 and dynamite,71
but has been withheld as to dealers in automobiles,72 packaged hair
dye,73 and sliding glass doors.74
The Washington position appears to be that recovery under an im-
plied warranty theory will generally be allowed against a retailer. Most
of the Washington cases so hold 7' and two of the three decisions
wherein recovery was denied can be distinguished on the basis of their
fact patterns. The automobile dealer expressly limited his warranty
liability by contract with the injured consumer.76 The building con-
tractor in the sliding glass door case77 was not a retailer of goods but
the Uniform Commercial Code can provide consumers with the equivalent protection.
Indeed, even when strict liability is applied to retailers, there will be times in which
an injured plaintiff will be entitled to relief under the Code provisions and not under
a strict liability theory. Thus, when a mother bought a can of applesauce, the contents
of which gave off a bad odor and caused her two sons, to whom she fed it, to gag, neces-
sitating the pumping of their stomachs, she was allowed recovery under the warranty
of merchantability, even though there was no showing that the contents were deleterious.
Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 15 Mich. App. 67, 166 N.W.2d 541 (1968) (Defendant
was a manufacturer.) Under the Code it is sufficient to show the product is not fit for
the ordinary purposes for which it is to be used. It is doubtful that recovery in this
case could have been given under the RESTATEmEwT (SEcoND) because it would have
been necessary to show the applesauce was deleterious in order to meet the burden of
proving a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.
However, the fact that protection for injured consumers is provided by the Code does
not obviate the reasons for adopting the rule of strict liability because, as was pointed
out in Ulmer, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 544, 452 P.2d at 733, the doctrine of strict liability
is preferable to a doctrine of implied warranty stripped of the customary incidents of
warranty.
66. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 537, 547 n.5, 452 P.2d 729, 734-35 n.5.
67. Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wn. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966);
Baum v. Murray, 23 Wn. 2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co.,
5 Vn. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76 (1940).
68. Larson v. Farmer's Warehouse Co., 161 Wash. 640, 297 P. 753 (1931).
69. Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wn. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957); Ringstad v.
I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wn. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952).
70. Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929).
71. Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wn. 2d 187, 401 P.2d 844 (1965) (dictum).
72. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) affirmed on second
appeal 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
73. Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
74. Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wn. 2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964) (held contractor
not retailer).
75. See cases cited in notes 67-71 supra.
76. Baxter v. Ford Motor -Co., 168 Wash. 456, 459, 12 P.2d 409, 411 (1932).
77. Dipangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wn. -2d 720, 724, 393 P.2d 936, 938 (1964). But
see House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 586, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (holding vendor of
lands subject .to implied warranty).
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a vendor of land. Neither of these cases justify exceptions to a general
rule of strict liability against all retailers because strict liability cannot
be disclaimed or expressly limited and extension of the rule to vendors
of land is not advocated.
There is, however, one general situation in which the Washington
court has declined to extend liability to retailers. In Esborg v. Bailey
Drug Co."8 the court adopted the Sealed Container Doctrine," which
exempts from liability retailers selling products packaged by the
manufacturer for resale in sealed containers, and thus denied recovery
against a retailer by a purchaser who had voluntarily selected a brand
name hair dye from the shelf. Esborg is of lesser importance today,
since it was decided under the implied warranty provisions of the
Uniform Sales Act."0 The strict liability theory advanced in Ulmer,
in contrast with the implied warranty rationale of reliance and mer-
chantability, is premised on the allocation of the risk of loss. This is
not to say that the Sealed Container Doctrine is no longer the rule in
Washington; its acceptance by the court was recent,8 ' and was made
only after extended consideration.82 It would be reasonable to conclude
that the court will not readily discard it.8"
However, the Sealed Container Doctrine should not be retained
under a rule of strict liability to retailers. The Doctrine may be ap-
propriate under the fault rationale of negligence theory or that of
reliance or merchantability under warranty theory; but it is inap-
propriate under a principle of loss distribution. 4 Furthermore, the
78. 61 Wn. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
79. See note 29 supra.
80. Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn. 2d 347, 354, 378 P.2d 298, 302 (1963).
81. Id. at 354, 378 P.2d at 302.
82. See Baum v. Murray, 23 Wn. 2d 890, 898-99, 162 P.2d 801, 805 (1945).
83. At least one jurisdiction which has extended the rule of strict liability to retailers
has adopted the Sealed Container Doctrine. McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d
736 (Fla. 1965).
84. The Sealed Container Doctrine was not recognized in the original RESTATMENT
or TORTS § 402 (1934), which expressed the view that a retail dealer of goods resold
in their original packages was liable if, by exercising reasonable care, he could have
discovered the dangerous condition of the product by virtue of his peculiar opportunity
and competence. This view was rejected in the RESTATENMNT O r TORTS § 402 (Supp.
1948), which adopted the Sealed Container Doctrine, relieving the retailer of any obliga-
tion to inspect goods he resells in their original packages. The reason given for the
change of position was that the revised view expressed the greater weight of authority.
The REESTATEXENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402 (1965) clarified the Doctrine in light of
its acceptance of strict liability in § 402A. The Sealed Container Doctrine was limited
to liability based upon negligence because negligence takes into account the actor's
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Rsborg court excluded food products from the Doctrine,85 and it is
difficult to see why the court should grant relief to a consumer poisoned
by a can of salmon, but not to a consumer burned by a chemical
preparation for hair which was used according to its directions. Ques-
tionable even as to its present application, the Doctrine certainly does
not deserve to be retained in a strict liability jurisdiction where loss
distribution is the central concern.
CONCLUSION
Commitment to the rule of strict products liability, as against all
manufacturers, has been made in Washington; it would be consistent
and fair to extend that rule to include all retailers as well. The distinc-
tions between retailers previously drawn by the Washington court in
applying the implied warranty rule are not appropriate under a strict
liability rule.
Of the various arguments which have been suggested in support of
extension of strict liability to retailers, the most persuasive are the
conduit theory and the need for a fair rule on the burden of proof.
The burden of proof for the injured party can be reduced for the small
cost of inconvenience to the retailer, who will act as a conduit to shift
the loss back to the manufacturer. Extension of the rule of strict
liability to retailers will further that rule's goal of optimal loss dis-
tribution with the greatest justice to all parties concerned.
knowledge, whereas strict liability is imposed irrespective of the actor's knowledge of
the particular facts giving rise to his liability. See comments to RESTATEmENT (SEcOND)§ 402.
85. 61 Wn. 2d 347, 354, 378 P.2d 298, 302 (1963).
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